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Lincoln’s Populist Sovereignty:
Public Finance Of, By, and For the People
Timothy A. Canova
In recent months, there has been a resurgence of interest in
the presidency of Abraham Lincoln, in no small part because a
new president, also from Illinois, has openly and repeatedly
identified with and invoked Lincoln.1 Academic interest in
Lincoln has mostly focused on the darker side of wartime
presidential powers, such as the suspension of civil liberties and
overstepping lines of constitutional authority. Far less attention
has been given to Lincoln as the activist executive who set a new
standard for mobilizing public finance in a crisis, pursuant to
express Congressional authority under the Legal Tender Acts,
presidential authority at its zenith.2 There is a modern tendency
to dismiss any lessons from the past, to believe that we have
little to learn from earlier ages and that our age is superior to all
that has come before.3 This is particularly so in the world of
finance. Perhaps the great financial crash of 2008 and its grim
economic aftermath may allow scholars to approach with some
humility Lincoln’s monetary experiment in issuing greenbacks
directly into circulation. Lincoln, after all, did mobilize public

This paper was presented as part of a panel, “What Would Lincoln Do?:
Constitutional Approaches to Wartime Finance and Economics,” at the 2009 Chapman
Law Review Symposium on Lincoln’s Constitutionalism in Time of War, Jan. 30, 2009.
Betty Hutton Williams Professor of International Economic Law and Associate
Dean for Academic Affairs, Chapman University School of Law.
1 Lee Siegel, Obama’s Muse: His literary and political inspiration, the career of
Abraham Lincoln, has a double edge, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2008, at W3; John F. Harris
and Alexander Burns, Straw Man? Historians say Obama is no Lincoln, POLITICO, Dec.
15, 2008, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1208/16569.html; James Oakes, What’s So
Special About a Team of Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at A43.
2 Recall Justice Jackson’s concurrence in the steel seizure case:
“when the
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can
delegate.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
3 According to Ortega y Gasset, “our age is characterized by the strange
presumption that it is superior to all past time; more than that, by its leaving out of
consideration all that is past, by recognizing no classical or normative epochs, by looking
on itself as a new life superior to all previous forms and irreducible to them.” JOSÉ
ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 44 (Anonymous trans., W.W. Norton &
Co., Inc. 1957) (1932).
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finances and therefore public energy on a grand scale that
continues to elude our own generation.
Lincoln is remembered for overcoming enormous political
and military challenges. Often overlooked, however, is the
economic and financial chaos he confronted upon taking office.
In the weeks prior to Lincoln’s inauguration, the nation was
swept by fear, the hoarding of gold, and a panic perhaps more
dangerous than other classic Keynesian liquidity traps in March
1933 and September 2008, since there was no central bank in
1861 with the authority to issue currency and inject liquidity into
the financial system to try to break a downward spiral by
restraining the psychology of hoarding.4
Lincoln’s approach to public finance was effective.
It
empowered the federal government with renewed fiscal capacity,
mobilized a massive army, unleashed great latent energy and
enormous economic growth.5 As we bemoan the many ills in
today’s financial marketplace, we may consider what Lincoln
would do if he was alive today. Would a president who asserted
executive control over public finance in time of a great civil war
do so in our time of obstinate foreign wars and market drama?
Today the task may be greater, particularly if private financial
interests have undermined the integrity of regulatory agencies
and Congress alike. Of course, if he were alive today, Lincoln
would also have to contend with all kinds of international
financial constraints, far different from what he faced in his own
time. This should not diminish from Lincoln’s model of national
economic sovereignty, but should instead prod us to think how
his approach could be updated and squared with the realities of

4 ROBERT P. SHARKEY, MONEY, CLASS, AND PARTY: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF CIVIL
WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 26–27, 39, 44 (John Hopkins Press 1959) (1959). It is
somewhat misleading to refer to the decades prior to the Civil War as a period of
“unprecedented quiescence of monetary issues.” Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Civil War
Finance: Lessons for Today, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 596, n. 30 (2009). This ignores both the
political and economic turmoil surrounding the First and Second Banks of the United
States, including the conflict between Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton and
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson over the First Bank, constitutional challenges to the
First Bank, and President Andrew Jackson’s veto of the recharter of the Second Bank on
constitutional grounds, as well as the financial turmoil that resulted in the wake of these
disputes. WILLIAM F. HIXSON, TRIUMPH OF THE BANKERS: MONEY AND BANKING IN THE
EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 89–120 (1993).
5 This was the view of Lincoln articulated by the economic historian Eliot Janeway
who wrote that Lincoln “never organized the Union for victory – he was too practical to
try. Instead, he inspired and provoked it to mobilize the momentum for victory. The
result was inefficient but irresistible. A victory small enough to be organized is too small
to be decisive.” ELIOT JANEWAY, THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL: A CHRONICLE OF
ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II 16 (Yale University Press 1951). As argued
below, it was in part through the Legal Tender Acts that Lincoln was able to provide the
tools to mobilize.
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today’s global financial marketplace and national political
institutions.
At the time of this writing, the U.S. banking and financial
system remains in serious trouble, unemployment and home
foreclosures are at dangerously high levels. The real economy
suffered a deep contraction, one of the sharpest drops in history.6
The recovery appears weak and fraught with danger. The U.S.
trade and current account deficits exceed $700 billion a year,
requiring capital inflows of more than $2 billion a day.7
Meanwhile, the federal budget deficit has grown from more than
$485 billion in the final year of the Bush administration to $1.6
trillion today.8 Now, with the first installment of a bank bailout
costing $700 billion, a fiscal stimulus package of $787 billion, and
the Federal Reserve spending another trillion to prop up the
markets, a big question on the minds of investors and public
officials around the world is how the U.S. will pay for this
spending, and whether so much federal borrowing will ultimately
undermine the value of the dollar and lead to renewed inflation
and some future financial chaos.9
This essay will consider Lincoln’s financing of the Civil War
and its possible application to today’s crisis. Lincoln expanded
the scope of federal authority by creating the nation’s first fiat
currency since the American Revolution, a strategy that was seen
by many, including himself, as necessary to the financing of the
Union’s military efforts.10 This approach harkened back to the
emergency measures of the Continental Congress during the
American Revolution and the economic development strategies of
the colonies prior to the Revolution. It foreshadowed New Deal
financing during the Great Depression and was also comparable
to the low interest rate financing of the U.S. effort in World War
II. Perhaps an enriched view of this history will provoke fresh

6 Michael Tsang & Whitney Kisling, Obama May Inherit Bull Market After $6
Trillion Loss, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601110&sid=akRyOGDs1EHI#.
7 See Jennifer Hughes, Drop in US inflows spooks dollar, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dda665fc-9e58-11da-b641-0000779e2340.html
(reporting disturbing drop in U.S. capital inflows from approximately $3 billion a day to
approximately $2 billion a day); US surprises: trade deficit down; budget shortfall up,
MERCOPRESS, Aug. 13, 2008, http://en.mercopress.com/2008/08/13/us-surprises-tradedeficit-down-budget-shortfall-up.
8 Rodger Runningen, U.S. Deficit to Reach Record $490 Billion in 2009,
BLOOMBERG, July 28, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&refer=
news&sid=ae7O8o2c0iNY.
9 Nelson D. Schwartz, Hearing Stimulas, Fearing Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009,
at B1 (reporting estimate by Niall Ferguson, a Harvard historian, that $2.2 trillion in new
U.S. government debt will be issued in 2009, assuming approval of the stimulus plan).
10 MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY MISCHIEF: EPISODES IN MONETARY HISTORY 45 (1992).
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insights about today’s financial difficulties and challenging
institutional environment.
I. LINCOLN’S LEGAL TENDER ACTS
When Lincoln was elected in November 1860, the money
supply in the United States consisted of about 28% gold coins, 3%
silver coins, and about 69% in bank created money, mainly bank
notes and bank deposits (or check book money) created by statechartered banks.11 This was not a money supply conducive to a
strong national government. Indeed, on the day of Lincoln’s
inauguration, March 4, 1861, the Union was on shaky ground.12
When Fort Sumter was fired upon barely a month later, the
Union Army had only 17,000 soldiers.13 Lincoln’s response was
to organize the most impressive mobilization of military
manpower in American history up to that time. Within a year,
the Union Army numbered nearly 200,000, by the end of 1863 it
was more than 600,000, and by the end of 1863, the fateful year
of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the Union Army exceeded 900,000
men.14
The costs of this military buildup and the war were
enormous. According to William Hixson, the federal government
spent about $35 million on the war effort in 1861.15 In 1862 it
spent about $446 million, about a thirteen-fold increase.16 It was
not enough. Union wartime spending rose to $683 million in
1863, $826 million in 1864, and $1.2 billion in 1865.17
How was this war effort financed? There was no federal
income tax at the start of the war.18 Most federal revenues came
from the sale of public lands and customs duties.19 But with
homesteading rampant, public land sales revenue was falling.20
Also, without duties on southern exports, and despite passage of

HIXSON, supra note 4, at 129.
The day of Lincoln’s first inauguration, March 4, 1861, was also the birth of the
college that would become Chapman University. The History of Chapman University,
http://www.chapman.edu/about/chapfacts/history/history2.asp (last visited March 14,
2009).
13 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 129.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 132, 139.
18 Id. at 130.
19 Id.
20 The Homestead Act was passed in 1862. LEONARD P. CURRY, BLUEPRINT FOR
MODERN AMERICA: NONMILITARY LEGISLATION OF THE FIRST CIVIL WAR CONGRESS 108
(Vanderbilt University Press 1968) (1968). The Morrill Land-Grant College Act, which
provided for use of public lands for establishing colleges, was signed by Lincoln in the
same year. Id. at 114–15.
11
12
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the Morrill Tariff in the days before Lincoln took office, customs
revenues began to fall as well.21
In 1861, the nation’s fiscal house was in crisis when
Congress authorized the Treasury to borrow $250 million by
selling bonds to big banks and paying 7% interest.22 In July
1861, in carrying out this Congressional authorization, Treasury
Secretary Salmon Chase entered into agreements with the banks
of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, which, like all banks at
the time, were state-chartered banks.23 These banks were to
purchase U.S. Treasury bonds with $50 million in gold.24 The
plan was for the Treasury to then spend the gold back into
circulation, which it hoped would then be deposited back into the
banks, thereby allowing them to lend again and again to the
Treasury.25 However, due to the psychology of fear and hoarding
that swept the nation, the gold did not return to the banking
system.26 The banks suspended payment in gold and so did the
Treasury.27
This left Chase with few viable options, hoping the banks
would extend loans to the Treasury or pay for US Treasury bonds
in the form of banknotes and bank credits rather than gold.28
During the Buchanan presidency, the federal government was
paying ruinous interest rates of 10 to 12%, and the yield would
likely have to rise even higher to induce the banks to lend to the
Treasury.29 This was neither a viable nor a sustainable option.
Instead, Congress found other means, with Lincoln signing
the first of three Legal Tender Acts on February 25, 1862,30 to
create a new government-issued, irredeemable paper currency
21 SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 18; Roger L. Ransom, The Economics of the Civil War,
EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA, (ed. Robert Whaples), Aug. 25, 2001, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/
article/ransom.civil.war.us. The North was harmed by the loss of tariff revenues from
Southern cotton exports, as well as the loss of Southern purchases of Northern
manufactured products. Id.
22 SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 20.
23 Id. at 21.
24 Id.
25 See id. (Stating that “[i]n essence, though not in legal form, the banks were acting
as underwriters”).
26 Id. at 27.
27 Id.; HIXSON, supra note 4, at 129–31. In praising the “de facto regime of quasifree banking” prior to the Civil War, Hummel argues that the currency “consisted solely of
state bank notes redeemable for specie on demand.” Hummel, supra note 4, at 596. This
ignores the gold hoarding that preceded Lincoln’s inauguration and the suspensions of
payment in gold later that year, indicating a failure in the free banking regime. The
weaknesses in the free banking regime were perhaps masked by major discoveries of gold
in California beginning in 1849, but became apparent when gold production slowed at a
time of rising public financing requirements. HIXSON, supra note 4, at 121–31.
28 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 130–31.
29 SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 18.
30 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 131; SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 49.
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(i.e., not redeemable in gold or other specie), United States Notes
known as “the Greenback,” which were declared by government
fiat to be legal tender for all private debts (hence, the term fiat
money).31 By war’s end there would be nearly $450 million in
these Greenbacks.32
The Constitution provided no specific authority for Congress
to create a currency, but neither was there any express
prohibition on such Congressional power.33
At the time,
numerous public officials, businessmen, bankers, and financial
experts supported The Legal Tender Acts.34 They called on the
federal government to assert constitutional authority over the
currency and keep the profit from the issuance of currency for the
taxpayer, a practice known as “seigniorage.”35 For instance, in
the floor debate, Representative Thaddeaus Stevens argued that
the government and not the banks should have the profit from
creating a medium of exchange.36
Lincoln himself wrote, in a letter dated December 6, 1864,
that Treasury Secretary Chase had thought the issuance of legal
tender notes was “a hazardous thing but we finally accomplished
it and gave the people of this Republic the greatest blessing they
ever had—their own paper money to pay off their debts.”37
Although Chase had misgivings about the Greenback, by
February 1862, Chase wrote, in a letter to the New York Post, “I

31 MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY MISCHIEF: EPISODES IN MONETARY HISTORY 45 (1992)
(describing fiat paper money as “notes that are issued on the fiat of the sovereign”
specified in value and declared as legal tender for payment of debts).
32 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 131; SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 49. Congress began
removing the greenback from circulation in 1879 when it made the greenback redeemable
in gold. GRETCHEN RITTER, GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE ANTIMONOPOLY TRADITION
AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE IN AMERICA 24, 38 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997).
33 See HIXSON, supra note 4, at 89–90. Delegates to the Constitutional Convention
voted down a proposed clause that would have given the federal government specific
authority to issue paper money, and also voted down a proposed clause that would have
denied the federal government such authority. Id.
34 The list of public officials included Congressional leaders, majorities in both
houses of Congress, the President, an apparently reluctant but willing Treasury
secretary, Salmon Chase, and Attorney General Edward Bates. HIXSON, supra note 4, at
131, 133-35, 150 (reporting the support of Henry C. Carey, the so-called founder of the
American School of Economics); SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 30, 31, 35 (“Letters of support
[for the first Legal Tender Act] from various bankers and business men pointed up the
fact that the [opposing] opinions of the associated bankers [of New York, Boston, and
Philadelphia] voiced in Washington, by no means represented the sentiments of the
business community at large.”).
35 Seigniorage is defined as “the return on the monopoly right to print money held
by domestic monetary authorities.” PETER MOLES & NICHOLAS TERRY, THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TERMS 491 (1997).
36 BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS AND POLITICS IN
THE CIVIL WAR 192 (1970).
37 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 133.
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consent to the expedient of United States Notes in limited
amounts being made a legal tender.”38
Of the $3 billion direct cost of the war to the North, taxes
paid for about 20 percent, borrowing in the form of bank paper
covered about 65 percent, and the Greenback paid for about 15
percent.39 The peak years for the new currency were 1862 and
1863 when the Greenback paid for nearly 40 percent of the costs
of the Civil War to the North.40 In his December 1862 message to
Congress, Lincoln explained the necessity of the action:
The suspension of specie payments by banks . . . made large issues of
United States Notes [Greenbacks] unavoidable. In no other way could
the payment of the troops . . . be so economically or so well provided
for. The judicious legislation of Congress . . . has made them a
universal circulating currency . . . saving thereby to the people
immense sums in discounts and exchanges.41

This was the same message to Congress in which Lincoln
said:
The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy present.
The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the
occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew.
We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.42

Some historians insist the Greenback was not necessary
because it never accounted for a majority of the funds used to
carry on the war and that the government may have been able to
sell its securities below par.43 More persuasive are those like
Leonard Curry, who concludes: “To leave the country dependent
on a motley array of irredeemable, often counterfeited, frequently
worthless bank paper was not only to invite, but to insure,
disaster.”44 Likewise, historian Robert Sharkey points out that a
majority of the members of Congress “were not willing to subject
the credit of the government to such a trial.”45

Id. at 133–34.
Id. at 132–33, 139–40; Hummel, supra note 4, at 599, fig. 3. Ransom put the
direct government expenditure costs to the North at $2.7 billion and concluded that the
Greenback accounted for about 18 percent of all government revenues. Ransom, supra
note 21.
40 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 132.
41 Id. at 134.
42 Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in T HE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953) (1953).
43 See DON C. BARRETT, THE GREENBACKS AND RESUMPTION OF SPECIE PAYMENTS,
1862-1879 25-57 (Harvard Univ. Press 1965) (1931); SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 32–33.
44 LEONARD P. CURRY, BLUEPRINT FOR MODERN AMERICA: NONMILITARY
LEGISLATION OF THE FIRST CIVIL WAR CONGRESS 197 (Vanderbilt Univ. Press 1968)
(1968).
45 SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 33.
38
39
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In addition to the Greenback, Congress passed legislation in
1862 creating the National Banking System, providing for the
chartering of federal banks that were required to purchase large
amounts of federal bonds to hold as security against the national
bank notes they would issue.46 Although the National Banking
System did not take the form of a central bank, it can still be
seen as a forerunner of the Federal Reserve, also privately-owned
and directed to support the federal government’s fiscal needs by
purchasing federal bonds.47 While this was an improvement from
the chaos that had preceded the National Banking Act, it was
still lacking from the perspective of government finance when
compared with the approach of the Federal Reserve during World
War II, which kept interest rates near zero percent for federal
government securities.48
For the Confederacy, the cost of the war was about $2.25
billion, of which about $250 million was raised in taxes and $500
million was borrowed.49 The rest, about $1.5 billion, or nearly 60
percent of the Confederacy’s war costs, was in printing press
money.50 The Confederate currency collapsed in value, the victim
of a counterfeiting war strategy by the North.51
There has also been criticism of the inflation that coincided
with the Greenback, with some claiming this was the result of
not making the Greenback redeemable in gold.52 But, as
discussed above, the record shows a rather wise management by
Congress, with the amount of paper currency issued limited to
only about 12 percent of the total financing of the war and
peaking at less than 40 percent in 1862 and 1863.53 According to
Roger Ransom, Northern wages did not keep pace with inflation,
but fell by about 20 percent during the war.54 Even this, Ransom
concluded, was not as severe as it would seem since agriculture,
not industry, was the largest economic sector in the North, and
“farmers fared much [better] in terms of their income during the
war than did wage earners in the manufacturing sector.”55
Ransom, supra note 21.
Committee for Monetary Reform v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 766 F.2d 538, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The Federal Reserve Banks are private
corporations whose stock is owned by the member commercial banks within their
districts.”) (citing to 12 U.S.C. § 321).
48 Richard H. Timberlake, Federal Reserve System, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS, 2008, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FederalReserveSystem.html.
49 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 148.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 FRIEDMAN, supra note 31, at 57.
53 Hixson, supra note 4, at 132, 140.
54 Ransom, supra note 21.
55 Id.
46
47
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The inflation in the North was less a function of any overissuance of currency and more the result of a classic wartime
boom with excess demand pulling up prices faster than
manufacturing wages.56 Public administration was at a rather
rudimentary and unsophisticated stage of development at the
time of the Civil War.57 It would have to wait until the next
century, after civil service reforms and the rise of a federal
bureaucracy during World War II for the tools to contain such
inflationary forces.
For instance, throughout World War II, the federal
government found the means to finance an even more impressive
military buildup and war effort. As a practical matter, the
central bank lost its independence during the 1941–1951
period.58
The Federal Reserve was required by political
convention with the White House and Treasury to purchase
government securities in any amounts and at any price needed to
keep the yield on government debt pegged at near zero for shortterm securities and barely two percent for long-term bonds, the
functional equivalent of printing money for the war effort.59
With such an easy money policy during World War II, the
federal government was able to increase wartime spending to
nearly forty-five percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
nearly double today’s levels of federal spending.60
Some
economists point to the easy money and heavy reliance on
seigniorage during World War II to explain the end of the Great
Depression.61 Of course, easy money without federal spending
would likely not have increased either the velocity of money or
aggregate demand. While easy money in the 1930s brought some
recovery from the Depression,62 it was only the massive fiscal

56 GEORGE T. MCJIMSEY, THE DIVIDING AND REUNITING OF AMERICA: 1848–1877 87–
89 (1981).
57 See Id. at 196–97.
58 See Timothy A. Canova, American Wartime Values in Historical Perspective: FullEmployment Mobilization or Business as Usual, 13 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 13–14
(2006) [hereinafter Canova, American Wartime Values].
59 Id. at 13.
60 Timothy A. Canova, Non-State Actors and the International Institutional Order:
Central Bank Capture and the Globalization of Monetary Amnesia, 101 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 469, at 470–71 nn.8–9 (2007) (citing to tables of the 1984 and 2007 Annual Reports
of the Council of Economic Advisers).
61 Hummel, supra note 4, at 605.
62 Christina D. Romer, What Ended the Great Depression?, 52 J. ECO. HISTORY 757,
757–58 (Dec. 1992). Romer cites to a 1956 article by E. Cary Brown for support that fiscal
policy “seems to have been an unsuccessful recovery device in the ‘thirties—not because it
did not work, but because it was not tried.” Id. at 758.
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stimulus, albeit accommodated by the central monetary authority
that ended the Depression once and for all.63
The economy roared, with real growth rates of greater than
fifteen percent for three consecutive years, the fastest economic
growth in American history.64 Yet, the federal government also
managed to maintain price stability through a program of
regulatory controls on prices, wages, and capital flows, and
margin requirements on borrowing for private consumption,
stock speculation, and housing construction.65 In fact, consumer
price inflation was less than three percent a year for the final
three years of the war.66
The World War II model was actually extended for several
years after the war, in large part because of the need for
continued massive federal spending on the Marshall Plan
reconstruction of Europe and Japan, the Korean War effort, and
the G.I. Bill of Rights spending on education, health care,
housing, and jobs for the sixteen million veterans of World War II
(fully one-quarter of the U.S. work force).67
This followed a long tradition of federal government
intervention to promote economic growth.
For example,
Alexander Hamilton, as Treasury Secretary, in his Report on
Manufacturers, much of which was adopted by Congress, had
called for subsidies to industry, paid for in part by tariffs on
imports, to encourage the growth of manufacturing, as well as
the building of roads and canals.68 Decades later, Henry Clay
would incorporate Hamilton’s ideas into the “American System,”
which was adopted by Lincoln in his fiscal program of subsidies
to encourage economic development, which could be seen as a

63 Bruce Bartlett, The Real Lesson of the New Deal, FORBES, Feb. 13, 2009 (arguing
that “in terms of fiscal policy, Roosevelt’s error [in the 1930’s] wasn’t that he spent too
much, but that he didn’t spend nearly enough”).
64 Canova, American Wartime Values, supra note 58, at 5 n.12.
65 Id. at 14–15, n.67.
66 Id. at 16.
Hummel seems to acknowledge that a central bank-dominated
monetary regime is fully capable of producing high inflation and contributing less to
economic growth than a monetary regime characterized by Treasury-issued currency
when he writes that “during America’s Great Inflation of the 1970s, seigniorage accounted
for only 2 percent of federal revenue, which translates into less than half a percent of
GDP.” Hummel, supra note 4, at 607.
67 Timothy A. Canova, Closing the Border and Opening the Door: Mobility,
Adjustment, and the Sequencing of Reform, 5 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 341, 393–94 (2007)
[hereinafter Canova, Closing the Border].
68 MICHAEL LIND, HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC: READINGS IN THE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC
NATIONALIST TRADITION 72–73 (1997).
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modification of mercantilism and a precursor to Keynesian
economic policies.69
To be sure, critics of this model will claim that the cure is
worse than the disease, and that an easy money policy and active
fiscal policy can work only if the federal government imposes
controls which are said to be incompatible with a free-market
economy, and that inflation is bound to return once the controls
are lifted or relaxed.70 But this line of argument understates the
range of government regulations and interventions that are
routinely imposed on any free-market economy, even during
times of hard money. Further, it also ignores the moral and
strategic context in which wartime controls have been imposed.
If inflation is merely delayed, the question becomes what was
gained during the interval of delay. The World War II era
controls that suppressed and delayed inflation until the late
1940s and early 1950s provided the federal government with the
breathing space and resources necessary to win a world war
against fascist tyrannies in less than four years and then to
rebuild war-torn Europe and Japan and integrate one-quarter of
the U.S. work force.71 Not a bad trade-off, indeed.72
Likewise, Lincoln used the resources of easy money for grand
purposes. It took four bloody years of fighting but the scourge of

69 MICHAEL LIND, WHAT LINCOLN BELIEVED: THE VALUES AND CONVICTIONS OF
AMERICA’S GREATEST PRESIDENT 23, 72–73 (2004); ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR,
FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (Oxford U.
Press, 1970) (1970).
70 See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1867-1960 558 (1963). The authors argue:
The result was that “prices,” in any economically meaningful sense, rose by
decidedly more than the ‘price index’ during the period of price control. The
jump in the price index on the elimination of price controls in 1946 did not
involve any corresponding jump in ‘prices’;; rather it reflected largely the
unveiling of price increases that had occurred earlier. Id.
See also Robert Higgs, Wartime Prosperity? A Reassessment of the U.S. Economy in the
1940s, 52 J. ECO. HISTORY 41, 54–55 (Mar., 1992), available at
http://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=138.
71 See Canova, American Wartime Values, supra note 58, at 15–16.
72 Hummel also argues that the World War II debt burden was reduced by high
inflation after the war. Hummel, supra note 4, at 603. But inflation remained largely
contained throughout the 1950s and 1960s, rising to significantly high levels only in the
late 1970s. It is more accurate to conclude that the World War II debt burdens were
reduced by maintaining low interest rates and high real economic growth rates which
contributed to high tax revenues even while tax rates were being reduced. Hummel also
repeats the claim of Robert Higgs that war always “ratchets up” post war spending and
government intervention. Id. at 592, n. 3. First, it is instructive to point out that federal
spending during World War II peaked at about forty-five percent of GDP; today it is about
twenty-six percent of GDP. Moreover, it may be that, had U.S. and foreign governments
spent and intervened far more in their economies prior to the 1930s, the global Great
Depression and the cataclysm of World War II may very well have been averted.
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slavery was finally lifted from the nation. Both wartime
presidents, Lincoln and Roosevelt, understood they could ill
afford to lose their wars or pass them on to future generations.73
As Justice Jackson would write in his concurrence in the socalled Steel Seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v.
Sawyer (1952), “the power to legislate for emergencies belongs in
the hands of Congress.”74 National emergencies and war need
not expand the powers of Congress and the President, but they
do provide the opportunity for the elected branches to act to the
full extent of their constitutional powers. This was the case with
the constitutional legacy of the Legal Tender Acts that paved the
way for other far-reaching monetary reforms during the New
Deal.
In June 1864, after securing re-nomination and with the
financial position of the Union in better shape, Lincoln accepted
the resignation of his Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase.75
Several months later, partly to placate the Radical wing of his
party, Lincoln nominated Chase as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. In one of history’s great ironies, when the Legal Tender
Acts were challenged, Chase would twice vote to declare the
Greenback unconstitutional.76
In Hepburn v. Griswold (1870), Chase refused to disqualify
himself and in fact delivered the decision declaring the
Greenback unconstitutional and ruling that Congress could not
make the Greenback legal tender in payment of all debts, public
and private.77 As characterized by Milton Friedman and Anna
Schwartz, Chief Justice Chase essentially convicted himself of
having been responsible for an unconstitutional action in his
prior capacity as Secretary of the Treasury.78
At issue before the Court in Hepburn was the validity of
contracts made before the war.79 The decision was applied also to
contracts entered into after the war.80 A major portion of the
nation’s money supply was suddenly rendered worthless for the

73 See Timothy A. Canova, The Mystical Roots of American Political Democracy:
Social Justice and Religious Belief in a Newer World, in RELIGION AS ART (Univ. of New
Mexico Press 2009) (discussing the similarities between Lincoln and Roosevelt as mystical
political leaders).
74 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
75 CLARENCE EDWARD MACARTNEY, LINCOLN AND HIS CABINET 259–60 (Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1931).
76 FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 70, at 46–47.
77 Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
78 FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 70, at 46.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 47.
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satisfaction of debts.81 But, then, two vacancies on the Court
were filled by President Grant and amid charges of courtpacking, the Legal Tender Acts came up once again before the
new Court.82 This time, in Knox v. Lee (1871), the Greenback
was upheld as constitutional, reversing Hepburn by a 5-to-4 vote,
this time with Chase in dissent.83 The Court held in Knox that
Congress did indeed have authority to reasonably decide what
definition of legal tender would best serve the public interest.84
Finally, in Julliard v. Greenman (1884), in a third Legal Tender
case, the Court upheld the power of Congress to create legal
tender currency in peacetime.85
During this time there were parallel Court decisions holding
that the Legal Tender Acts were not intended to bar enforcement
of private contracts requiring payment of debts in gold.86 Such
“gold clauses” were a device to protect creditors from repayment
in depreciated currency, particularly until the Greenback became
redeemable in gold in 1879.87 Half a century later, by Executive
Order in April 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt ordered the
seizure of gold in an effort to forbid hoarding.88 Gold clauses
were once again used to protect creditors.89 But later in 1933,
Congress simply outlawed these gold clauses by joint resolution,
and in 1935, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the joint resolution by a 5-to-4 vote, holding that Congress has
authority to exert ultimate control in defining lawful media of
exchange to satisfy debts, even for private contracts made prior
to the legislation.90
The cumulative effect of the Legal Tender cases and the gold
clause cases was to permit Congress to once again authorize the
issuance of Greenbacks, this time during the Great Depression.
According to Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, the Thomas
Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
authorized the issuance of $3 billion in United States Notes.91 In
addition, the amendment authorized the Treasury to revalue its
gold holdings and realize a large “paper” profit; as a result, it

Id. at 48.
Id. at 47 n.47.
Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
Id. at 553.
Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 450 (1884) (upholding an act of 1878
reissuing greenbacks and declaring them to be legal tender in payment of private debts).
86 FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 70, at 469.
87 Id. at 468–69.
88 Id. at 462–63.
89 Id. at 463.
90 Id. at 469.
91 Id. at 470.
81
82
83
84
85
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could print additional paper money titled “gold certificates” to a
nominal value of nearly another $3 billion.92
Within each of these lines of cases, the Legal Tender cases
and the gold clause cases, urgent circumstances existed that
initially justified the use of positive regulation to compel citizens
to accept government paper as legal tender for payment of all
debts, private and public.
In both the 1860s and 1930s
democracy and freedom were subject to the gravest of challenges.
The responses of Congress and the President were similar. In
each instance, the federal government asserted sovereignty over
the currency and financial system, thereby empowering the
government with enormous fiscal capabilities that helped
mobilize the nation for war and develop the country’s economic
resources for decades.
II. EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY
Much like Lincoln’s Greenback, colonial governments issued
paper currency that was not redeemable in gold and was declared
by government fiat to be legal tender for the payment of debts.93
The colonial currencies were lent into circulation through statecontrolled land banks and were secured by mortgages on the
borrowers’ property at low interest rates, usually five percent.94
According to historian James Ferguson, “[a] modern
economist finds the tactics of colonial government analogous to
those of the New Deal and in some ancestral relationship to
present-day Keynesian doctrine.”95 For instance, during the
Great Depression, first under Hoover and then under Roosevelt,
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation lent millions to U.S.
industry.96
Likewise, the federal Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation, founded in 1933, offered mortgage loans directly to
homebuyers at five percent with repayment periods of up to
twenty-five years.97 But the moneys for these New Deal lending
programs were mostly borrowed by the Treasury Department
through the sale of government bonds.98 In contrast, some

Id. at 470, 518 n.33.
A. Barton Hepburn, History of Currency in the United States 71 (The Macmillan
Co. 1915) (1915).
94 E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
FINANCE, 1776-1790 5 (Univ. of North Carolina Press 1961).
95 Id.
96 MARK I. GELFAND, A NATION OF CITIES: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN
AMERICA, 1933–1965 29(Oxford Univ. Press 1975)(1975).
97 C. LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME OWNERS' LOAN
CORPORATION 1 (National Bureau of Economic Research 1951);
98 GELFAND, supra note 96, at 48.
92
93
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colonial governments actually created the currency that was lent
into circulation without incurring government borrowing costs.99
While Lincoln’s Greenback was spent into circulation and
earned no interest for the government, the colonial currencies
were actually lent into circulation, thereby earning interest for
colonial governments. In fact, in the middle colonies, “the loans
served as a substitute for taxes,” and the interest received by
these colonial governments “was sufficient to pay most of the
ordinary cost of administration.”100 While land banks were less
successful in New England and the south, currency emissions in
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland were regarded
as stable, and were never great enough in volume as to impair
credit.101
According to Ferguson, historians agree that Pennsylvania’s
currency was held in universal esteem, a principal factor in the
colony’s growth and prosperity, and maintained “without fear of
repudiation and to the manifest benefit of the province”:
Pennsylvania managed a land bank almost continuously after 1723
without mishap. For more than twenty-five years before the French
and Indian War, the interest received by the government supported
expenses without the necessity of direct taxes. Relative freedom from
taxation probably contributed to Pennsylvania’s remarkable
growth.102

None other than Adam Smith, the grandfather of classical
economics, described the currency emissions in glowing terms:
The government of Pennsylvania without amassing any treasure [i.e.,
any stock of gold or silver] invented a method of lending, not money
indeed, but what is equivalent to money, to its subjects. [It advanced]
to private people at interest, upon security on land to double the
value, paper bills of credit . . . . made transferable from hand to hand
like bank-notes, and declared by act of assembly to be legal tender in
all payments from one inhabitant of the province to another.103

According to numerous historians, the price level in
Pennsylvania during the fifty-two years prior to the American
Revolution and while Pennsylvania was on a paper standard
“was more stable than the American price level has been during

HIXSON, supra note 4, at 53.
FERGUSON, supra note 94, at 5–6.
101 Id. at 6–8.
102 Id. 6, 13, 16. Hummel asserts, “No one needs to be reminded that government
cannot create resources out of thin air.” Hummel, supra note 4, at 597. The colonial
experience suggests otherwise. Colonial governments created currency out of thin air,
lent the currency into circulation, and the result was the bringing to market of real
resources. See HIXSON, supra note 4, at 53–54.
103 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 48–49 (words in brackets are Hixson’s).
99
100
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any succeeding 50 year period.”104 This price stability was due in
large part to the commonwealth’s wise management of its
currency emissions. In The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776,
Adam Smith wrote:
Pennsylvania was always more moderate in its emissions of paper
money than any other of our colonies. Its paper currency accordingly
is said never to have sunk below the value of the gold and silver which
was current in the colony before the first emission of its paper
money.105

Thomas Pownall, also writing during this period, concluded
that there “never was a wiser or better measure, never one better
calculated to serve the uses of an encreasing country . . . never a
measure more steadily pursued, nor more faithfully executed for
forty years together.”106
The British did not look favorably on the colonial practices,
and the British Parliament passed the Restraining Act of 1764
forbidding enactment of such legal tender laws.107 According to
William Hixson, Parliament acted at the behest of British
bankers who “wanted the colonies, rather than creating their
own notes, to acquire a colonial money supply by borrowing
banknotes in Britain (at interest payable in specie [i.e., gold or
silver coin]).”108 Protests immediately broke out in New York,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, “colonies
which were scarcely in the grip of leveling elements.”109
Benjamin Franklin fought enactment of the Restraining Act
of 1764 and tried to get it repealed.110 One of the main reasons
for the alienation of the American colonies from the mother
country, according to Franklin, was the restrictions on paper
money.111 Franklin wrote, “Every colony was ruined before it
made paper money” as gold coin was drawn away by the
purchase of imports from Britain.112

104 Richard A. Lester, Currency Issues to Overcome Depressions in Pennsylvania,
1723 and 1729, 46 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 324, 325 (June 1938), (quoted in
HIXSON, supra note 4, at 51.)
105 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 356–57 (ed. Edwin Cannan 1994).
106 THOMAS POWNALL, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES, 4th ed. (London
1768), at 185, (quoted in FERGUSON, supra note 94, at 16).
107 FERGUSON, supra note 94, at 15.
108 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 56.
109 FERGUSON, supra note 94, at 15.
110 Id. at 16.
111 Id.
112 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 47 (brackets omitted). According to Ferguson, there was
significant popular unrest in New York which was “stilled only by the repeal of the
Townshend duties, but also by a special act of Parliament which allowed the colony to
issue paper money.” FERGUSON, supra note 94, at 16.
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The monetary experiment continued during the American
Revolutionary War, which was paid to a remarkable extent by
issue of paper currency known as the “Continental” despite an
acute shortage of specie.113 But the paper money was issued and
counterfeited in large quantities out of all proportion to increases
in the output of goods and services.114 Therefore the currency
declined sharply in value in terms of gold and silver, and there
was runaway price inflation during the war.115
Previously, in many of the colonies, counterfeiting was a
serious problem that threatened and often did undermine the
confidence and value of their currencies, particularly in the south
and northeast colonies.116 Pennsylvania’s lieutenant governor,
Patrick Gordon, in a speech to the state Assembly, warned:
It may not unjustly be compared to the Poisoning the Waters of a
Country; the blackest, and most detestable Practice that is known,
and which the Laws of Nations, and those of War condemn even in
declared Enemies; for as that destroys the Lives of the innocent in
taking their Natural Food, this would effectively overthrow all Credit,
Commerce and Traffick, and the mutual Confidence that must subsist
in Society, to enable the Members of it to procure to themselves and
Families their necessary Bread.117

While most counterfeiting of colonial currencies had been
carried on by private criminal gangs, with the advent of the open
rebellion, the British made counterfeiting a wartime strategy.118
According to historian Kenneth Scott, “for the first time in
history, counterfeiting was resorted to by a government to
undermine confidence in the currency, and thereby the credit, of
the enemy.”119
The Continental currency actually held its value during the
first year or two of the Revolution even though it was not
redeemable in specie.120 But as early as the first week of January
1776, if not before, a printing press aboard the H.M.S. Phoenix, a
British ship of forty-four guns lying in New York harbor, was
turning out counterfeits of the thirty dollar bill of emission.121
When New York fell to the British, it became and remained the

116

HIXSON, supra note 4, at 73.
Id.
Id. at 73–74.
KENNETH SCOTT, COUNTERFEITING IN COLONIAL AMERICA 93 (Oxford Univ. Press

117
118
119
120
121

Id. at 11.
Id. at 253.
Id.
FERGUSON, supra note 94, at 18.
Scott, supra note 113, at 253.
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chief source of counterfeits made by the British or with British
sanction.122
The record is replete with evidence of a massive and largely
successful counterfeiting effort by the British.123 Franklin wrote
that “immense quantities of these counterfeits, which issued from
the British government in New York, were circulated among the
inhabitants of all the States, before the fraud was detected.”124
This, he said, depreciated the whole mass, “first, by the vast
additional quantity, and next by the uncertainty in
distinguishing the true from the false; and the depreciation was a
loss to all and the ruin of many.”125
According to Scott, “[f]requently the colonies were put to the
trouble and expense of recalling whole emissions. Sometimes
trade was greatly hampered or, as in Virginia in 1773, came to a
complete standstill.”126 Moreover, the general depreciation of the
Continental currency (hence the term, “not worth a Continental”)
meant that the Continental Congress was forced to issue even
more currency to pay for its war efforts. While the specie value
of the currency emissions remained roughly steady in 1777 and
1778, a period of intense counterfeiting, the paper amounts of the
currency issued rose sharply.127 A vicious cycle set in. Previous
counterfeiting and over-issuance was depreciating the currency
so greatly while the demands of war remained so pressing “that
money had to be printed every month, then every fortnight.”128
In 1779, John Jay defended the issue of paper money and blamed
depreciation on the widespread counterfeiting by the British.129
Gouverneur Morris, the person chiefly responsible for
planning the use of paper money, had previously been opposed to
the project.130 But like others in the Continental Congress, he
agreed that in a crisis, paper money was the only option
available.131 Without the power to tax, however, the Congress
had no effective means of retiring its paper money from
circulation after it had served its purpose of paying for war
provisions.132 Appeals were made to the states to tax a portion of

Id. at 253–54.
See id. at 253–63.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id. at 262.
127 FERGUSON, supra note 95, at 28.
128 Id. at 29.
129 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 78.
130 DONALD R. STABILE, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE: DEBATES OVER
MONEY, DEBT, AND TAXES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA, 1776–1836 23 (1998).
131 Id.
132 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 86–87.
122
123
124
125
126
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the paper money and send those back to Congress to retire the
bills, but to no avail, the money was not forthcoming.133 The
states did not come through, and this defect in the allocation of
taxing authority contributed further to the depreciation in the
currency.134
Franklin was more sanguine than others about the currency
depreciation which he viewed as “a kind of imperceptible tax”
that was more progressive than other taxes:135
The general effect of the depreciation [of Continental and state bills]
among the inhabitants of the states has been this, that it has operated
as a gradual tax upon them. Their business has been done and paid
for by the paper money, and every man has paid his share of the tax
according to the time he retained any of the money in his hands and to
the depreciation within that time. Thus it has proved a tax on money,
a kind of property very difficult to be taxed by any other mode: and it
has fallen more equally than many other taxes, as those people paid
most, who, being richest, had most money passing through their
hands.136

Franklin’s defense of the inflation tax was probably a
combination of putting the best face on a bad situation, along
with a vestige of his general enthusiasm with paper money going
back to the pre-Revolutionary experience in colonial
Pennsylvania. While many were horrified by the depreciation
and inflation, others believed the war could not have been fought
and independence could not have been won without the issues of
paper money.137 According to the historian Donald Stabile,
“Highly regarded leaders such as Thomas Paine and Alexander
Hamilton looked at the issuance of paper money as a necessary
and a reasonable substitute for taxes.”138 Franklin stressed that
when the war began, the colonies “had neither arms nor
ammunition, nor money to purchase them or to pay soldiers” and
it was the paper currency that allowed Congress to pay, clothe
and feed the troops, fit out ships, and conduct the war.139

STABILE, supra note 130, at 23.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24.
HIXSON, supra note 4, at 79 (quoting BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 9:134–35 (Albert Henry Smith ed., 1907)). In another letter,
Franklin wrote: “The currency as we manage it is a wonderful machine. It performs its
office when we issue it; it pays and clothes troops, and provides victuals and ammunition:
and when we are obliged to issue a quantity excessive, it pays itself off by depreciation.”
Id. (quoting FRANKLIN, supra note 132, at 7: 294).
137 STABILE, supra note 130, at 24.
138 Id.
As Stabile concluded, currency emissions during the Revolution were
overlarge, but supported by many as “a necessary evil.” Id. at 33.
139 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 77.
133
134
135
136
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The numbers support these conclusions.
According to
Hixson, the total cost of war for the American side was about
$168 million and the original specie value of Continental
currency issued was about $46 million, or nearly 40 percent of
the war’s total costs to the colonies.140
After the war, the Articles of Confederation marked a period
of weak federal authority. Class warfare between debtors and
creditors broke out throughout the new nation during a time of
such harsh treatment of debtors as debtor’s prisons.141 According
to Hixson, “By the end of 1786, seven states had new issues of
paper money in circulation—the size and legal-tender status of
the various issues reflecting the balance of power between
creditors and debtors of the particular states.”142 Not all state
currencies were badly managed, but even where the legal tender
bills were kept fairly steady, the problems of interstate commerce
in a confederation with multiple currencies still existed.143
The Constitutional Convention settled the issue in favor of
creditor interests by adopting Article I, Section 10, forbidding
states from emitting bills of credit (paper money) or passing any
law impairing the obligation of contracts, which included debt
contracts.144
In the drafting of the Constitution, creditor
interests clearly had the upper hand. Early American history
has since been skewed against paper money. As Ferguson
concludes:
Upon reviewing the evidence, it appears that the impression of
colonial public finance conveyed by later scholars gives a misleading
background for a financial history for the Revolution. The efforts of
the American provinces to create a medium of exchange, provide
agricultural credit, and equip government with the means of incurring
and discharging responsibilities, hardly constitute a “dark and
disgraceful” picture, nor, on the whole, a record of failure. Most
colonies handled their currency with discretion and were successful in
realizing the purposes associated with its use.145

In creating the Greenback, Lincoln and the Civil War
Congress had to overcome the traditional bias against a
government-issued fiat currency. The multiple interconnected
crises that they faced—political disintegration, economic
stagnation, financial panic, and military exigency—suggest the

140
141
142
143
144
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Id. at 74.
Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 85.
Id.
U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 10.
FERGUSON, supra note 94, at 24.
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nature of the sea change in conventional thinking. Necessity was
once again the mother of invention.
III. WHAT WOULD LINCOLN DO?
Some economists dismiss the significance of Treasury-issued
fiat currency by pointing out facile similarities with today’s
system of Federal Reserve-issued fiat currency. For instance,
Hummel argues that the two processes work out roughly the
same financially.146 The Fed creates money and loans it to the
Treasury at interest; but after covering its operating expenses
(several billion dollars), the Fed rebates around ninety percent of
such interest payments (some tens of billions of dollars) back to
the Treasury.147 This ignores that the money rebated annually is
in the tens of billions of dollars, while the Treasury must pay in
the hundreds of billions of dollars in interest to its bondholders,
both domestic and foreign, who happen to also own shares in the
Federal Reserve banks that take part in deciding the interest
rate that Treasury will pay to its bondholders.
Hummel makes an important concession about the difference
between government issued currency and privatized currency
issuance: “The one thing that does change under a central bank
is who is in charge of issuing fiat money, and the resulting
incentives.”148 Indeed. When Treasury issues currency and
spends it into circulation, it pays no interest. When Treasury
issues currency and lends it into circulation, it earns interest,
and is thereby able to reduce the tax burden for taxpayers.
When a central bank, like the Federal Reserve, issues currency
and lends it to Treasury, it is that same central bank that now
sets the rate of interest on all short-term Treasury borrowing,
including the interest that Treasury pays to bondholders other
than the Federal Reserve, such as the commercial banks and
investment banks that hold trillions of dollars in Treasury debt
and also happen to exercise formal and informal influence in the
Federal Reserve’s interest rate decisions.
History bears out certain advantages that Treasury-issued
currency has over a regime dominated by an autonomous central
bank. For instance, the Greenback allowed the North to issue
currency and spend it into circulation without incurring interest
charges.
However, to the extent that Greenbacks were
insufficient in the amount of United States Notes actually issued,
the North had to finance much of the rest of its war effort by

146
147
148

Hummel, supra note 4, at 604.
Id. at 604–05.
Id. at 605.
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borrowing banknotes at significant interest rates, thereby adding
to the burdens of future taxpayers.149
Likewise, during World War II, the effect of central bankissued money was ameliorated by the fact that the Federal
Reserve was not functionally independent and interest rates on
all government debt were essentially set by the Treasury.150 As a
result, the Treasury was able to borrow at near zero interest
rates.151 This was the so-called “pegged period” in which the
Federal Reserve kept interest rates pegged at 3/8 of one percent
on short-term Treasury debt and about 2 percent for longer-term
Treasury bonds.152
By contrast, in more recent years, the Federal Reserve has
set interest rates on all Treasury debt through decisions made by
its Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), a committee which
includes the seven members of the Fed’s Board of Governors, as
well as the twelve unelected and un-appointed presidents of the
regional Federal Reserve Banks, which are privately owned by
the same commercial banks that have profited by the higher
interest rates set by the FOMC on Treasury securities.153
Several economists, including Nobel laureate Paul Krugman,
have spoken of “cognitive regulatory capture” to describe the
intellectual uniformity that has pervaded central bank thinking
and let to the triumph of deregulatory ideology.154 With regards
to the Federal Reserve, the agency capture is not just cognitive
capture, but a matter of institutional design. The presidents of
the regional Federal Reserve Banks, though acting functionally
as officers of a supposedly federal agency, are not appointed by
the President of the United States and not subject to Senate
confirmation.155 The Federal Reserve System further evades
149 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 139–42. See also BERT W. REIN, AN ANALYSIS AND
CRITIQUE OF THE UNION FINANCING OF THE CIVIL WAR 31–51 (Amherst C. Press 1962)
(discussing the Union’s use of greenbacks and borrowing to finance the Civil War).
150 Canova, American Wartime Values, supra note 58, at 13.
151 Id.
152 Timothy A. Canova, Financial Liberalization, International Monetary Dis/order,
and the Neoliberal State, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1279, 1300 (2000) [hereinafter Canova,
Financial Liberalization].
153 See Canova, American Wartime Values, supra note 58, at 21–22; Note, The
Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing of Governmental Power with Private
Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 111, 116–18 (1989).
154 Paul Krugman, Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman on the Economy: The Return of the
Depression Economics, The Washington Post (Transcript, Dec. 15, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/discussion/2008/12/11/DI2008121102406.
html. (last accessed August 16, 2009).
155 After Timothy Geithner stepped down as president of the New York Federal
Reserve Bank to become Treasury Secretary, the New York Fed named William C. Dudley
as its new president after a search headed by the chairman and deputy chairman of the
board of directors of the privately-owned New York Fed. There was no formal
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oversight by not relying on a penny of congressional
appropriations, and by its exemption from various statutes such
as the Federal Advisory Committee Act and certain provisions of
the Freedom of Information Act.156 Finally, the governors
themselves serve for fourteen-year terms, longer than three
presidential administrations and longer than any other officer of
the federal government.157
Although the Federal Reserve rebates much of the interest it
receives from the Treasury, it has traditionally set short-term
interest rates much higher than during the 1941–1951 peg, while
surrendering the long-term rate to market forces.158 As a result,
the Treasury’s interest rate burdens have risen to enormous
levels: net interest payments by the federal government have
risen from about $14 billion in 1970 to $52 billion in 1980, $184
billion in 1990, and approximately $250 billion by 2008.159
To focus only on the interest payments rebated by the
Federal Reserve to Treasury, while ignoring the Treasury’s
enormous interest payments to private bondholders misses key
differences between a regime of Treasury-issued currency and a
monetary regime dominated by central bank-issued currency. Of
involvement by the Obama administration or Congress in the search, and certainly no
input from any other interests from civil society. Press Release, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, New York Fed Names William C. Dudley President, (Jan. 27, 2009), (on file
with Chapman Law Review).
156 In late 2008, the Federal Reserve refused a request by Bloomberg news to disclose
information about the recipients of more than $2 trillion in emergency loans from U.S.
taxpayers made by the Fed and the assets the Fed is accepting as collateral. Bloomberg
filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act and the Fed responded by asserting the
Fed’s express FOIA exemptions related to trade secrets and commercial information.
Mark Pittman, Fed Refuses to Disclose Recipients of $2 Trillion (Update 2), BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=
apx7XNLnZZlc&refer=home. The District Court rejected the Fed’s argument and ordered
the Fed to disclose the identities of the borrowers in several of its emergency lending
programs. Bloomberg L.P. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, No. 08
Civ. 9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336 at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009) (Preska, C.J.). The
Fed subsequently asked for a delay in enforcement of the disclosure order until the case
can be heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit where it is presently
pending at the time of this writing. Mark Pittman, Federal Reserve Says Disclosing
Loans
Will
Hurt
Banks
(Update1),
BLOOMBERG,
Aug.
27,
2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aAOhgVw78e3U.
157 See Canova, American Wartime Values, supra note 58, at 22. There have been
numerous challenges to the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve System, on both
private non-delegation and Appointments Clause grounds, but all have been dismissed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on narrow procedural grounds (lack of
standing for private plaintiffs and a newly-created equitable discretion doctrine for
congressional plaintiffs). Canova, Closing the Border, supra note 63, at 404.
158 Canova, American Wartime Values, supra note 58, at 14–15, 21.
159 Economic Report of the President: 2009 Report Spreadsheet Tables, Council of
Economic Advisors, Table B-80, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables09.html
(last
accessed March 4, 2009). Hummel seems to acknowledge the disadvantage of centralbank issued currency: “Such privately created money, even when its quantity expands,
provides no seigniorage.” Hummel, supra note 4, at 607.
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course, in addition to the interest paid by Treasury to private
bondholders must be added the trillions of dollars in hidden
subsidies and guarantees made by the Federal Reserve to prop
up U.S. financial institutions, interbank lending, and money
markets. Last year, after the Federal Reserve subsidized J.P.
Morgan’s $29 billion acquisition of Bear Stearns, former Fed
Chairman Paul Volcker questioned the central bank’s
independence.160 Since then the Fed has come to the rescue of
other clients, including the American Insurance Group (AIG),
Citigroup, and Bank of America, and creditors and
counterparties of AIG such as Goldman Sachs and perhaps
various favored hedge funds, while propping up financial
markets for the same private financial interests.161
The Federal Reserve, now the model of autonomous central
banks around the world, is not a disinterested entity, but is
stacked with the representatives of financial institutions that
have numerous interests that conflict with the interests of the
Treasury Department and the taxpayer. The enormous transfers
of wealth from the taxpayer to large financial institutions that
are a central feature of a privatized system of money creation
make little sense at any time, and particularly in a time of war,
economic recession, or other national crisis.
Such wealth
transfers apparently made little sense to Lincoln or Roosevelt,
both of whom found ways around the straight-jackets of so-called
“sound money” and “sound finance.”
Roosevelt followed Lincoln’s wartime example by taking
control of the commanding heights of finance to pay for the
military effort in World War II.162 During Lincoln’s tenure, this
meant having the Treasury issue currency directly into
circulation, as authorized by Congress. During World War II, it
meant bringing the Federal Reserve under the direction of the
Treasury to lend freely to the federal government. In both of
these models, the federal government asserted its financial and
economic sovereignty to achieve the most important policy
objectives of generations in crisis. It is certainly fair to ask what
a comparable assertion of financial and economic sovereignty
would or should look like today.

160 Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Former Fed Chair Volcker: Financial Crisis not Over,
REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/telecomm/
idUSN1933392020080320.
161 Andrew Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Reports Loss of $61.7 Billion
as U.S. Gives More Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/03/03/business/03aig.html.
162 Hummel, supra note 4, at 593.
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The present financial and economic crisis, the worst since
the Great Depression, has raised a range of proposals, most of
which involve the expenditure of large sums of federal revenue,
including the $787 billion fiscal stimulus, the $700 billion
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to assist financial
institutions in distress, Treasury Secretary Geithner’s proposal
to spend up to another $2 trillion of taxpayer money to purchase
the toxic assets of failing banks in partnership with certain
hedge funds deemed co-investors.163 The programs already
authorized will add significantly to the federal budget deficit,
which now exceeds $1.6 trillion and could soon approach $2
trillion a year. As Hummel correctly points out, all of this
additional debt, much of it foreign debt, raises the specter of a
possible sovereign default by the U.S.164
The economic recovery of the 1930s, however insufficient in
size, was spurred in large part by the monetary stimulus
stemming from the devaluation of the dollar and inflows of
gold.165 It could be that a similar devaluation, if done in an
orderly way, could help inflate our way partly out of this debt
deflation. The experience of the 1940s suggests, however, that
further fiscal stimulus may be needed to pull out of the present
recession and keep the economy from falling into a deeper
financial crisis and depression. If what is needed is federal
spending of the magnitude of the 1940s (recall, 45 percent of
GDP), then several questions are raised: (1) what would be the
appropriate outlets for spending when it makes no sense to have
assembly lines producing aircraft carriers, tanks, warplanes, and
other armaments; and (2) how to pay for such a massive fiscal
stimulus.
Perhaps a new G.I. Bill of Rights for the present generation
would restore the purchasing power for the middle class to put
the economy back on a growth path. Others point to the vast
physical infrastructure needs of the public sector, which has been
estimated in the trillions of dollars just to repair roads and

163 Mike Caggeso, Fed Announces $800 Billion in Homeowner, CONSUMER AND SMALL
BUSINESS AID, Moneymorning.com, Nov. 26, 2008, http://www.moneymorning.com/
2008/11/26/consumer-business-bailout/; Pallavi Gogoi, Sue Kirchhoff, Barbara
Hagenbaugh & Kathy Chu, Bailout plan: Foreclosure issues still a major hurdle, USATODAY, Feb.
13, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2009-02-10-bailout-details_N.htm.
164 Hummel, supra note 4, at 611–12; see also Michael Pettis, Is the US trade deficit
sustainable? Is China’s trade surplus?, Jan. 13, 2009, http://mpettis.com/2009/01/is-the-ustrade-deficit-sustainable-is-china%E2%80%99s-trade-surplus/.
165 Romer, supra note 62, at 759.
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bridges, as well as water, sewage, and other capital
improvements.166
One proposal that was rejected as an amendment to the 2009
fiscal stimulus package would have authorized the Treasury to
issue bonds for spending on transit, water, highway, bridge, and
road infrastructure projects by federal, state or local
government.167 One problem with this proposal, as with the
entire stimulus package, is that it would have added to the
federal deficit and national debt, made the U.S. more dependent
on foreign borrowing, and possibly undermined the value of the
dollar and stability of U.S. financial markets.
A somewhat different approach was proposed in 1999 by
Representative Ray LaHood (like Lincoln, a Republican from
Illinois), who introduced legislation to create $360 billion in
United States Notes to be lent interest-free to state and local
governments over a five-year period to fund capital projects.168
The bill, entitled the State and Local Government Empowerment
Act, received about 22 cosponsors but never made it out of

166 See John Bacino, Investing in Crumbling Infrastructure in the States Before It's
Too Late, PROGRESSIVESTATES.ORG, Aug. 9, 2007, http://www.progressivestates.org/
blog/650/investing-in-crumbling-infrastructure-in-the-states-before-its-too-late
(last
visited Mar. 10, 2009).
167 H.R. 852, which was introduced by Representative Loretta Sanchez (DemocratCalifornia) and did not specify actual amounts to be appropriated, would have authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to issue bonds, to be known as “Re-Build America Bonds,”
for spending on transit, water, highway, bridge, and road infrastructure projects by any
governmental
unit.
H.R.
852,
111th
Cong.
(2009)
available
at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-852. Congresswoman Sanchez is a
1982 graduate of Chapman University. Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez – About
Loretta,
http://www.lorettasanchez.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=18&Itemid=21 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
168 H.R. 1452, the State and Local Government Empowerment Act, introduced April
15, 1999 in the 106th Congress, 1st Session. H.R. 1452, 106th Cong. (1999) available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h106-1452. The bill had at least twenty-two
cosponsors and was referred to the House Banking and Financial Services Subcommittee
on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, and the House Budget Committee. Id.
In 2003, LaHood introduced apparently similar legislation, H.R. 4310 and H.R. 4371, to
direct the Secretary of Commerce instead of Treasury to make noninterest bearing loans
to state and local governments for capital projects. This time, the legislation had seven
cosponsors, including Representative Rahm Emanuel (Democrat-Illinois), who is now
President Obama’s White House Chief of Staff. H.R. 4310, 4371, 108th Cong. (2004)
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h106-1452&tab=related.
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committee.169 Significantly, Mr. LaHood is now Secretary of
Transportation in the Obama administration.170
Mr. LaHood’s proposal was a variation of the Sovereignty
Loan Proposal, an initiative drafted by a private Illinois citizen
Ken Bohnsack, and like the Sovereignty Loan Proposal, was
modeled on Lincoln’s Greenback.171 Under the LaHood proposal,
the annual increase in the money stock would be well below the
current levels of money growth, and therefore no more
inflationary than privately-issued currency by the logic of
monetarists.172 In addition, the newly-issued currency could be
removed from circulation when paid back to the Treasury, or
circulated again in the form of new loans to state and local
governments. Most importantly, the $360 billion that would
have been created under the LaHood proposal would not add a
single penny to the federal deficit, the national debt, or foreign
borrowing. The federal government would incur no interest or
principal obligations.173 Furthermore, if the issuance of these
United States Notes were to lead to some devaluation of the
dollar, perhaps that would provide some monetary stimulus to
recovery.
In addition to the needs of state and local governments, and
proposals for fiscal stimulus to restore economic growth, there is
the problem of the financial system itself.
The federal
government has pumped nearly $700 billion into the biggest
commercial banks, which were sinking under the weight of their
declining portfolios of mortgage-backed securities, unmarketable
derivatives, and other asset-backed securities.174 A number of
169 H.R.
1452, 106th Cong. (1999) available at http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h106-1452. According to Section 5 of the bill, every state, county,
township, incorporated municipality, school district, and Indian tribe would have been
entitled to obtain a loan in amounts based on resident population. Section 7 provided
maturity periods of the loans to be between 10 and 30 years, and based on the estimated
number of years of the useful life of the infrastructure financed by the loan. Upon
repayment, the funds would be transferred to the U.S. government, presumably for use in
future interest-free loans. Id.
170 U.S. Department of Transportation / Ray LaHood http://www.dot.gov/bios/
lahood.htm. LaHood has a record of supporting mass transit and transportation
infrastructure construction and improvement. Adam Doster, “Ray LaHood? Really?,
PROGRESS ILLINOIS, Dec. 17, 2008, http://progressillinois.com/2008/12/17/ray-lahoodreally.
171 Telephone Interview with Ken Bohnsack (Feb. 4, 2009). Bohnsack has recently
suggested that the LaHood proposal should be revised from interest-free loans to outright
grants to state and local governments for capital investment. Id.
172 Monetarist Theory of Economics, http://www.interzone.com/~cheung/SUM.dir/
econthym1.html (last visited March 14, 2009).
173 H.R. 1452, 106th Cong. (1999) available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=h106-1452.
174 Dan Wilchins, U.S. aid to banks seen exceeding $700 billion, REUTERS, Oct. 21,
2008 http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSTRE49K8OK20081021.
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commentators advocated nationalization of these banks to
restore them to solvency, with an eye to privatizing or converting
them into banking cooperatives in the future.175 This might be
one way to stop the financial hemorrhaging without having to
spend billions or trillions more in taxpayer money.
Others have proposed having the federal government and/or
state governments charter and capitalize new banks, publiclyowned and managed, to lend directly to U.S. businesses and
consumers.176 To the extent new banks are capitalized by the
federal government, this would once again provide an
opportunity to finance the new investment through the issuance
of United States Notes. It could also suggest a return to the
colonial model of public finance where the government itself
lends money into circulation at interest, and with the interest
earned thereby reducing the tax burden on ordinary citizens.
Likewise, the proposal by Senate Republicans, also rejected
during the fiscal stimulus debate, to have the federal government
offer 30-year fixed rate mortgages at 4 percent, would have
required some outlay of public funds, and presumably significant
federal borrowing to finance the plan.177
If the federal
government were to borrow at less than 4 percent, then its profit
could be applied to pay for the difference between the new 4
percent mortgages and today’s prevailing mortgage interest rate,
which was estimated at above 5 percent.178 Once again, although
not proposed by the Senate Republicans, this could have also
presented an opportunity for the federal government to issue and
lend currency directly into circulation and thereby reduce tax
burdens by hundreds of billions of dollars from the interest
earned on a high volume of such refinancing transactions.
Finally, proposals to have state governments charter and
capitalize their own banks would provide a way around the
Article I, Section 10 prohibition against states emitting paper
money.179 For instance, in 1919, North Dakota established the

175 Interview by the Real News Network with Timothy Canova, Worst week ever on
world
markets
(Oct.
11,
2008)
available
at
http://therealnews.com/t/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=2557 (advocating
nationalization model used by Sweden in the 1990s); Tunku Varadarajan, Nationalize’ the
Banks: The Weekend Interview with Nouriel Roubini, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21–22, 2009, at
A9.
176 Willem H. Buiter, ’Good Banks’ Are the Cost Effective Way Out of the Financial
Crisis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21–22, 2009, at A11.
177 Jeanne Sahadi, Stimulus: Senate’s housing hope, CNNMONEY, Feb. 2, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/01/news/economy/Senate_stimulus_housing/.
178 Id.
179 Ellen Brown, A Radical Plan for Funding a New Deal, YES! MAGAZINE, Dec. 2008,
http://www.yesmagazine.org/article.asp?id=3162.
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Bank of North Dakota, the only state-owned bank in the nation,
to lend funds to the private sector to encourage agriculture,
commerce, and industry within the state.180 Created with $2
million of capital, today the Bank of North Dakota operates with
more than $160 million in capital, provides federally insured
student loans, and draws on a deposit base that includes all state
funds and funds of state institutions.181 While the Bank of North
Dakota does not actually create currency, like the land banks in
colonial America it does provide credit and, with any interest
earned, reduces the tax burdens on its citizens.
For the past generation, the economic orthodoxy has claimed
that the Federal Reserve System, the model of an autonomous
and largely unaccountable central bank, is the only alternative to
allowing elected public officials exercise authority over currency
and monetary policy. But these pretensions of economics as a
science have led to wrong-headed conclusions that government is
incapable of resolving our most important problems and
competing claims. Today’s collapsing financial bubble economy
suggests that we pay a steep price when letting self-interested
bankers and their chosen technocrats monopolize these monetary
functions. Surely a central bank could be designed that ensures
diversity of perspectives and a pluralism of interests while
maintaining some degree of policy-making autonomy. We should
ask why there is no room for industrial capital, perhaps the
National Association of Manufacturers, and the representatives
of industrial unions, public sector employees, and student debtors
on the boards and committees deciding currency and monetary
policy. Instead of a marketplace of ideas and a forum to test
one’s theories, our central banks have become echo chambers for
flawed and outdated orthodoxies.
Perhaps the most important questions we face are not those
of economic science or competing models of public finance and
currency creation.
Rather, perhaps they are political and
strategic in nature and ultimately moral questions: whether we
face existential challenges as great as did the generations of
Americans who looked to Lincoln and Roosevelt for vision and
leadership.
According to Lincoln, “The monetary needs of increasing
numbers of people advancing toward higher standards of living
can and should be met by the government. . . . The issue of

180 Bank of North Dakota, http://www.banknd.nd.gov/bndhome.jsp. (last visited Mar.
10, 2009).
181 About Bank of North Dakota, http://www.banknd.nd.gov/about.jsp (last visited
Mar. 10, 2009).
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money should be maintained as an exclusive monopoly of the
National Government.”182 Lincoln’s approach to public finance,
like Roosevelt’s, was one of populist economic sovereignty: the
reassertion of democratic control of the financial system, as
permitted under the Constitution, to empower the elected
branches of government to meet the needs of the day in an hour
of pressing need.

182 HIXSON, supra note 4, at 146 (quoting from GORHAM MUNSON, ALLADIN’S LAMP
124 (N.Y.: Creative Age Press 1945) (1945)).

